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A HAGUE JUDGMENTS CONVENTION?
Friedrich K. Juenger*
I. INTRODUCTION
I am delighted to have been invited to the Brooklyn Law
School's Symposium entitled "Enforcing Judgments Abroad:
The Global Challenge," which gives me the opportunity to
discuss a topic that has been on my mind for quite some time.
Listening to my good friend Arthur von Mehren evokes memo-
ries of a long conversation I had with him six years ago on the
Island of Rhodes, where we talked about the feasibility and
modalities of a convention on judgments recognition, the prop-
er venue for negotiating it and what features such a potential
treaty should have. It turned out that we had rather divergent
views on all of these points. Although I have read Arthur's
written Symposium contribution carefully, and listened to him
attentively, I still question both the need for and the prospects
of the type of convention whose contours Arthur has sketched
for us.'
II. THE NEED FOR A JUDGMENTS CONVENTION
A Prior Experiences
Belying the old adage "once burned, twice shy," in spite of
an earlier, less than happy experience,2 a United States dele-
gation is once again prepared to negotiate with its foreign
counterparts a Hague convention on judgments recognition.
* Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Professor of Law, University of California at Da-
vis.
1. See Arthur T. von Mehren, Enforcing Judgments Abroad: Reflections on the
Design of Recognition Conventions, 24 BROoK. J. INT'L L. 17 (1998); see also CATH-
ERINE KESSEDJIAN, INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL
AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS (Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, Prel. Doc. No.
7, Apr. 1997) [hereinafter KESSEDJIAN REPORT].
2. See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 24.39 (2d ed.
1992); Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments:
A New Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 271, 275
(1994); Kurt H. Nadelmann, The Common Market Judgments Convention and a
Hague Conference Recommendation: What Steps Next?, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1282,
1285, 1288 (1969).
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One of the reasons why that earlier initiative came to naught
was that the (then six) member states of the European Com-
munity were preoccupied with framing a regional compact,'
the Brussels Convention4 (signed in 1968), and the rather un-
satisfactory nature of the 1971 Hague Convention on the Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters5 (1971 Judgments Convention), which
never became effective. Not only was that document of the
"unilateral" variety,' thus leaving signatories free to claim
jurisdiction on their own idiosyncratic grounds (though an
optional "Supplementary Protocol" would have eliminated
exorbitant jurisdictional bases), but its implementation also
required the cumbersome further step of executing bilateral
agreements between those nations that wanted to avail them-
selves of its provisions.7
Hope, however, blooms eternal, notwithstanding the fact
that this first disappointment in The Hague was not the only
setback the United States suffered in its endeavor to make the
world ripe for American judgments. After the United Kingdom
had joined the European Community and acceded to the Brus-
sels Convention, we tried to negotiate with our British friends
a bilateral judgments recognition treaty. Such a treaty would
at least have assured American domiciliaries and enterprises
3. See von Mehren, supra note 2, at 275; Nadelmann, supra note 2, at 1282-
85, 1287-88.
4. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments n Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32 [hereinafter Brussels
Convention] (for the consolidated, current text of this convention see 1990 O.J. (C
189) 1, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1413); see generally Patrick J. Borchers, Comparing
Personal Jurisdiction in the United States and the European Community: Lessons
for American Reform, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 121 (1992); Friedrich M. Juenger, Judi-
cial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the European Communities, 82 MICH.
L. REV. 1195 (1984); Peter F. Schlosser, Lectures on Civil-Law Litigation Systems
and American Cooperation with Those Systems, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 9, 38 (1996).
5. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Feb. 1, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249 [hereinafter 1971
Judgments Convention].
6. Concerning the drawbacks of this type of convention, see von Mehren,
supra note 1, at 23-25.
7. 1971 Judgments Convention, supra note 5, art. 21; Supplementary Protocol
to the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Feb. 1, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 271 [here-
inafter Supplementary Protocol]; see Kurt H. Nadelmann & Arthur von Mehren,
The Extraordinary Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law,
60 AM. J. N'L L. 803, 803-04 (1966).
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that judgments rendered against them in a Brussels Conven-
tion member state that were based on exorbitant jurisdictional
grounds would not be enforced against them in the United
Kingdom.' Alas, these negotiations came to naught even
though the United Kingdom and the United States share a
common legal heritage and the British have traditionally been
most liberal in recognizing foreign country judgments,9 be-
cause British insurance and manufacturing interests were
leery of excessive American jury verdicts and punitive damages
awards, as well as judgments in antitrust cases."0
B. Inducements to Other Countries
The inevitable pressure imposed by the need of having to
do better than we have done in the past is not the only reason
why those negotiating judgments recognition treaties on behalf
of the United States deserve our sympathy. To begin with,
what inducements can this country offer to persuade other
nations that they should enter into an international judgments
recognition convention with us? In the United States, foreign
country judgments are already liberally recognized either as a
matter of common law" or pursuant to the Uniform Foreign
Money Judgments Recognition Act' (Uniform Act), which has
become law in many states, including the major industrial
ones. While the U.S. Supreme Court initially required a limit-
ed form of reciprocity," state courts have largely abandoned
this requirement,'4 as has the Uniform Act.
To be sure, some states have reintroduced reciprocity, an
ill-conceived notion, 5 in their version of the Uniform Act. 6
8. See Brussels Convention, supra note 4, art. 59; P.M. North, The Draft
U.K/U.S. Judgments Convention: A British Viewpoint, 1 NW. J. INTL L. & Bus.
219, 222-23 (1979).
9. See Friedrich K Juenger, The Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 9-11 (1988).
10. See von Mehren, supra note 2, at 274; North, supra note 8, at 230-31.
11. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 228 (1895) (narrowing the reci-
procity requirement); Phillips USA, Inc. v. Allflex USA, Inc., 77 F.3d 354, 359
(10th Cir. 1996) (applying state law).
12. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. 261 (1962).
13. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 170-71 (limiting reciprocity requirement to execute-
ry foreign money judgments in favor of nonresident alien against American defen-
dant).
14. See, e.g., Nicol v. Tanner, 256 N.W.2d 796, 801 (Minn. 1976); Johnston v.
Compagnie G6n~rale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 123, 124 (N.Y. 1926).
15. See Juenger, supra note 9, at 31-34.
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But whatever obstacles some states may put in the path of
judgments, recognition can be readily avoided by having a
foreign-country judgment recognized in a more liberal Ameri-
can jurisdiction, and that determination is then entitled to Full
Faith and Credit throughout the United States. Thus, the
contemplated Hague Convention can provide foreign signato-
ries, at best, with an incremental margin of assurance that
their judgments will be recognized in the United States. What-
ever potential minor improvement on existing recognition prac-
tices the contemplated convention might have to offer does not
amount to much of a bargaining chip. 7
C. American Interests
And what does the United States stand to gain? There
may be some American judgment creditors with horror stories
to tell about their inability to collect abroad on a domestic
judgment; but there does not seem to be an army of them
clamoring for greater comity. In fact, the typical foreign defen-
dants in American courts are global enterprises such as Volks-
wagen or Mitsubishi with enough domestic assets to satisfy
any American judgment. Even medium-sized and smaller for-
eign enterprises are bound to have open accounts or other
assets that American judgment creditors can readily attach.
Thus, the problem of recognizing American judgments abroad
tends to arise only in the event that the defendant is a fairly
small business or an individual. 8 In such cases counsel ought
to advise their clients to sue abroad, rather than waste time
and money in the hope of enforcing a domestic judgment that
may be considered excessive by foreign standards. But, as a
case decided by the German Bundesgerichtshof shows, even a
16. See MAURICE ROSENBERG ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 225 (10th ed. 1996).
17. See Patrick J. Borchers, A Few Little Issues For the Hague Judgments
Negotiations, 24 BROOK. J. INVL L. 157, 157-59 (1998); Russell J. Weintraub, How
Substantial is Our Need for a Judgments-Recognition Convention and What Should
We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 167, 178-84 (1998).
18. For a foreign case dealing with the.recognition of a California judgment
rendered against a German individual, see BGHZ 118, 312; see generally Peter
Hay, The Recognition and Enforcement of American Money-Judgments in Germa-
ny---The 1992 Decision of the German Supreme Court, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 729
(1992); Weintraub, supra note 17, at 181 n.83; Joachim Zekoll, The Enforceability
of American Money Judgments Abroad: A Landmark Decision by the German Fed-
eral Court of Justice, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 641 (1992).
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hefty American judgment rendered against an individual may
still be recognized, at least to the extent that it does not repre-
sent punitive damage. 9
Another reason advanced to justify the Hague negotiations
in terms of American interests are foreign exorbitant jurisdic-
tional assertions." To be sure, jurisdiction premised on such
spurious foundations as the plaintiffs forum contacts or the
presence of assets within the forum, do amount to a serious
breach of international etiquette and deserve censure.2 While
the Brussels Convention bars the use of exorbitant member
state jurisdictional assertions against European Union
domiciliaries,22 article 4(1) preserves them for use against
outsiders, such as American residents and corporations.' To
make matters worse, the Convention precludes signatories
from refusing to recognize, on grounds of public policy, member
state judgments rendered on such exorbitant grounds.' Re-
grettable as such Eurochauvinism doubtless is, it is open to
question whether the member states' jurisdictional exorbitance,
and its extension pursuant to Article 28(3), put American busi-
ness at risk. While it has been predicted that the Brussels
Convention's exorbitant features "may seriously affect the
interests of Americans with assets abroad,'R the concededly
anecdotal evidence I have been able to collect by reading for-
eign cases and literature suggests that European courts rarely
19. See BGHZ 118, 312 at 334; Hay, supra note 18, at 745-48.
20. See von Mehren, supra note 1, at 24.
21. See, e.g., Friedrich K Juenger, La Convention de Bruxelles du 27
Septembre 1968 et la Courtoisie Internationale-Rdflexions d'un Am4ricain, 72 RE-
VUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt 37 (1983); Kurt H. Nadehnann,
Jurisdictionally Improper Fora, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS
LAW: LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL E. YNTEMA 321 (Kurt H. Nadehnann et
al. eds., 1961); von Mehren, supra note 1, at 28.
22. See Brussels Convention, supra note 4, art. 3.
23. See id. art. 4(1).
24. See id. arts. 4(1), 28(3); von Mehren, supra note 1, at 20-21.
25. Nadelmann, supra note 2, at 1282. But see Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
Thoughts About a Multinational Judgments Convention: A Reaction to the von
Mehren Report, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 303 (1994) (noting in regard to
"the supposed nightmare that a judgment will be rendered against an American
defendant in a member state of the European Community on an exorbitant basis
of jurisdiction and then enforced against assets of the defendant in another mem-
ber state of the Community," that "[w]e have seen no such cases in the twenty
years since the Brussels Convention entered into effect, and it is unlikely that we
will see such cases-or at any rate many such cases-in the future"); Weintraub,
supra note 17, at 172-73; Schlosser, supra note 4, at 37.
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render judgments against American citizens or enterprises that
have no "minimum contacts" with the foreign forum.2"
III. NEGOTIATING PROBLEMS
A. Brussels and Lugano Countries
Furthermore, how eager will other nations be to enter into
the kind of convention currently contemplated by our negotiat-
ing team? An important group of industrial nations already
enjoys the benefit of a well-functioning regional arrangement.
The Brussels Convention has been a resounding success. Each
and every day of the week, member state judgments are en-
forced across legal and linguistic barriers with minimal trans-
action costs. So far, the European Court of Justice has ren-
dered more than ninety decisions,2" which have clarified a
considerable number of questions left open, or not dealt with
satisfactorily, by the Brussels Convention's drafters. Indeed,
the Brussels Convention-the single most important private
international law treaty in history-works so well that the
remaining European Free Trade Association nations have
entered into the parallel Lugano Convention."
The solid framework for inter-European judgments recog-
nition, which already links the signatories to their major trad-
ing partners, may well put in question the need for a broader
convention. In fact, the very presence of this group is bound to
complicate negotiations in The Hague, just as their initial
dealings interfered with the elaboration of the 1971 Judgments
Convention." To be sure, these European nations recognize
the need to further perfect the Brussels and Lugano docu-
26. In fact, the German Bundesgerichtshof has ameliorated the exorbitant
provision of § 23 ZPO-the German Civil Procedure Code-which authorizes the
exercise of full in personam jurisdiction over persons who own any assets in Ger-
many. See Juenger, supra note 4, at 1204. The Code does so by requiring some
relationship of the parties or the transaction in addition to the mere presence of
property. See Judgment of July 2, 1991, BGH, 11th Senate, BGHZ 115, 90.
27. See Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1027, 1038 (1995).
28. See Paul R. Beaumont, A United Kingdom Perspective on the Proposed
Hague Judgments Convention, 24 BROOK. J. INTIL L. 75, 89 (1998).
29. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M.
620.
30. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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ments, although they may not agree on exactly how to go about
it."' However, the delegates from Brussels and Lugano coun-
tries will have to take into account European interests, and at
least some of them are bound to take a common position in the
Hague.32 Moreover, having worked out the mechanics of inter-
national judgments recognition among themselves in a satis-
factory manner, they can be expected to look askance at ideas
proffered by other delegations that strike them as less sophisti-
cated and workable than their own practices.
B. American Jurisdictional Notions
The American delegation is also in an unenviable position
because American jurisdictional law is simply not fit for ex-
port."3 In consequence of well over a century of experimenta-
tion and vacillation, we are stuck with a confused, unwieldy
and, at times, unfair Supreme Court case law. In contrast to
not only civil law nations but also other common law coun-
tries, to this day we lack a rational catalog of jurisdictional
bases. Instead of reasonably clear and cogent provisions, as
they are found throughout the civilized world, we rely on a
jumble of state long-arm statutes and Supreme Court case law
that is chaotic and incoherent. Not only practitioners and
lower state and federal judges, but even law professors36 and,
at times, Supreme Court Justices,37 find it difficult to make
sense out of the hodgepodge of majority, concurring and dis-
senting opinions and the Court's opaque terminology. To this
day-over half a century after the landmark decision in Inter-
31. See Beaumont, supra note 28, at 80-104.
32. See id. at 80-82.
33. See Juenger, supra note 27, at 1038.
34. See, e.g., Order 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (England); Supreme
Court Rules 1970, part 10 (N.S.W., Australia).
35. For cogent critiques of American jurisdictional notions, see Symposium,
Fifty Years of International Shoe: The Past and Future of Personal Jurisdiction, 28
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 513 (1995). A succinct description of the root of the problem is
found in William M. Richman, Understanding Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 599, 600-02 (1993).
36. Charity prevents me from furnishing a citation.
37. Compare Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982) (White, J.) (discussing minimum contacts analysis) with
Worldwide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (White, J.) (discuss-
ing same).
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national Shoe Co. v. Washington38-- for instance, the parame-
ters of general jurisdiction remain doubtful; 9 not too long ago
our Supreme Court reaffirmed the propriety of exorbitant tag
jurisdiction, albeit for divergent reasons.4 °
However questionable our Supreme Court's contribution to
American jurisdictional law may be, the American delegation
in The Hague considers our highest court's case law to be non-
negotiable, because the Justices have imposed their mandates
as a matter of constitutional law. Ever since Pennoyer v.
Neff,4 the Court has taken the position that its pronounce-
ments are compelled by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. This proposition may be dubious, 42 but the
negotiators believe that their hands are tied. Unlike their
counterparts from other nations, the American delegates,
therefore, do not feel free to trade off this country's idiosyncrat-
ic rules and approaches for saner ones. At most, they are pre-
pared to shorten, but they are unwilling to lengthen, the do-
mestic long arm or the recognition of foreign judgments that do
not pass the muster of the Supreme Court's Due Process juris-
prudence.
IV. WHAT KIND OF CONVENTION?
A. Single, Double and Mixed Conventions
Caught in this dilemma, our team has attempted to wrig-
gle out of it by putting forward the notion of a "convention
mixte," a crossbreed between a "single" and a "double" conven-
tion.43 Such a mixed convention would not entirely preempt
the member states' jurisdictional rules. Rather, it would outlaw
specified exorbitant jurisdictional assertions and, in addition,
lay down a set of jurisdictional provisions that, if complied
with, would assure the resulting judgments recognition in all
member states." At the same time, the convention would al-
low member states to use jurisdictional bases that are neither
38. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
39. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984).
40. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
41. 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
42. See Juenger, supra note 27, at 1029, 1031.
43. See von Mehren, supra note 1, at 19.
44. See id. at 19.
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outlawed as exorbitant nor listed among those that predestine
judgments to recognition.
Put differently, between the recognized and the impermis-
sible heads of jurisdiction there would be a "gray zone"45 of
jurisdictional bases. The idea of a tripartite division of heads of
jurisdiction into black, white and gray (or "green, red and yel-
low lights"4) is not exactly new; it was already implicit in the
scheme of the ill-fated 1971 Judgments Convention, which
listed a set of "white" jurisdictional bases in Articles 10 and 11
and the "black" ones in Article 4 of the "Supplementary Proto-
col," leaving room for "gray" ones that would neither assure
nor preclude recognition by the other signatories.'
B. Prospects of a Mixed Convention
To repeat, the notion of a mixed convention is an attempt
by the American delegation to escape from the dilemma pre-
sented" by an unsatisfactory domestic jurisdictional law cast in
concrete by our Supreme Court. On the one hand, it permits
the other signatories to retain jurisdictional bases that might
not pass our Supreme Court's constitutional muster; on the
other, it allows us to retain such assertions as general jurisdic-
tion over foreign enterprises that do business in the United
States, which are suspect abroad. Whether such a hybrid con-
vention will be acceptable to other nations remains to be seen.
Even apart from possible aesthetic misgivings about an instru-
ment that is neither fish nor fowl, there are good reasons to
expect that such a scheme may encounter resistance abroad."
Foreign legal writers complain about the unsettled nature of
American jurisdictional notions49 and the exorbitance of
claiming general personal jurisdiction over individuals who are
45. See id.
46. Lowenfeld, supra note 25, at 289.
47. See 1971 Judgments Convention, supra note 5, arts. 10, 11; Supplementary
Protocol, supra note 7, art. 4; see also supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. In
contrast to the currently contemplated scheme, however, Article 2(1) of the Supple-
mentary Protocol merely allowed non-recognition of the resulting judgments, but
did not prohibit the rendering state from using the exorbitant bases. See Supple-
mentary Protocol, supra note 7, art. 2(1).
48. See KESSEDJIm REPORT, supra note 1, at 88; Schlosser, supra note 4, at
39; Weintraub, suprla note 17, at 184-86.
49. See HAIMO SCHA, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHT 158 (2d ed.
1996).
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served in the forum state ° and foreign corporations that "do
business" in the United States.51 Such excessive jurisdictional
assertions are perceived to be all the more threatening in light
of what foreign legal writers perceive as exorbitant substantive
rules, especially those allowing recovery of punitive damages52
and the "fabulous" amounts53 American juries award at times,
especially in products liability cases. These, of course, were the
very reasons why the project of a bilateral recognition treaty
with the United Kingdom foundered in spite of the two nations'
common legal heritage and their liberal recognition practic-
es. 54
A "convention double" cannot really alleviate these con-
cerns, even if the convention were to contain a broad public
policy reservation or a provision that would allow foreign
courts to cut down excessive American awards. Thus, the U.S.-
U.K bilateral treaty was not saved by a provision that would
have allowed the U.K courts to recognize American judgments
only to the extent that they do not vastly exceed the standard
of compensation available in the United Kingdom.55 Even if
excessive American judgments were not entitled to recognition
abroad, they would nevertheless pose a very real threat to
enterprises that have assets in the United States, as most
sizeable foreign corporations do. In other words, rules on recog-
nition are not as valuable a bargaining chip as jurisdictional
rules. Yet, it is of the very essence of a mixed convention to
leave intact bases of jurisdiction that we may consider proper,
but foreign countries are likely to deem exorbitant. The threat
they pose to foreign enterprises with assets in the United
States thus remains as long as they are left untouched; mak-
ing concessions on recognition does not alleviate the problem of
domestic enforcement of judgments based on a questionable
jurisdictional foundation.
50. See id, at 160-61; KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 82; Schlosser,
supra note 4, at 31, 39.
51. See KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 80; SCHACK, supra note 49, at
161, 288; Schlosser, supra note 4, at 24, 33, 41-43.
52. See SCHACK, supra note 49, at 337; Schlosser, supra note 4, at 47-48.
53. Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Bloch, [19831 2 All E.R. 72, 74 (CA.
1982) (Denning, M.R.) (enjoining plaintiff from litigating in Pennsylvania).
54. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
55. See Lowenfeld, supra note 25, at 294; von Mehren, supra note 2, at 274.
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V. Is THE HAGUE THE PROPER FORUM?
A. Drawbacks of Multilateral Negotiations
As is apparent, because of the peculiarities of American
jurisdictional and damages law, the position of American nego-
tiators in the Hague is not exactly rosy. Moreover, in addition
to facing a group of nations that adhere to the Brussels and
Lugano Conventions, they have to deal with representatives
from countries that may be less attuned to the realities of
interstate and transnational judgments recognition than the
United States and the European Union, both of which have
considerable experience with international civil procedure. By
virtue of the Full Faith and Credit clause and the Brussels and
Lugano Conventions, these two powers deal with jurisdiction
and recognition problems on a daily basis. To negotiate, at the
same time, with delegates from less experienced countries is
bound to complicate rather than simplify an already complicat-
ed matter. I, for one, would not be surprised if the obstacles to
reaching agreement were to prove insurmountable."
B. A Possible Alternative Forum
The Hague may simply not be the best venue; conceivably
a recognition treaty could be more fruitfully discussed with the
parties to the Brussels/Lugano Conventions. As I have suggest-
ed elsewhere," a Washington or Los Angeles Convention
(New York's name being preempted by the United Nations
Arbitration Convention)58 might present an alternative to a
Hague Convention. Two major industrial powers, with similar
social, political and economic cultures and linked by common
interests," each thoroughly familiar with the intricacies of
jurisdiction and "interstate" judgments recognition, should be
in an excellent position to frame a double convention. All par-
ties concerned would gain, the United States by being forced to
frame a set of jurisdictional rules that meet international stan-
56. See also ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE
QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS 109 (1996); Weintraub, supra note 17, at 220. For a
more optimistic prediction, see Borchers, supra note 17, at 165-66.
57. See Juenger, supra note 27, at 1043-44.
58. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, done June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
59. See von Mehren, supra note 1, at 25-26.
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dards, and the Brussels/Lugano nations by a constructive dia-
logue concerning necessary improvements of their regime.'
At the same time, the sheer pride of authorship would be a
strong incentive for the European Union and its neighbors,
confident of the quality of the multinational framework they
created, to engage in more intensive bargaining than that
which can be expected from them in The Hague.
C. Potential Advantages of Bilateral Negotiations
Should such negotiation ever come to pass, the American
delegation would of course have to be prepared for a true give-
and-take on jurisdictional issues, even to the extent that the
Supreme Court's case law appears to preclude concessions.
Jurisdictional practices that European nations have employed
successfully for over two decades, without anyone ever com-
plaining to the European Court of Human Rights, can hardly
be said to violate Due Process.6' In fact, the true benefit that
the United States could derive from such negotiations is the
opportunity to rethink our strange and wondrous law of juris-
diction, and to craft jurisdictional bases appropriate for an
international regime in clear and concise terms that are ac-
ceptable abroad. It would be a major achievement if we were to
rid ourselves, at long last, of the mishmash of state long-arm
statutes and ever-vacillating Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Not only would negotiations with the Brussels/Lugano
countries allow us to put our own house in order, we could
help the Europeans to rearrange theirs. One should think that
our foreign counterparts would be happy to rid themselves of
the embarrassment of national jurisdictional exorbitance pillo-
ried by Articles 3 of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions and
exacerbated by the respective Articles 28(3).62 They might also
be willing to do away with or amend certain questionable
heads of jurisdiction, such as the place of performance in the
respective Articles 5 of these Conventions.' We might even be
able to persuade them that the forum non conveniens doctrine
60. Cf. Beaumont, supra note 28, at 104-09.
61. See RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 6-7 (5th ed. 1988).
62. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., HLNE GAUDEMET-TALLON, LES CONVENTIONS DE BRUXELLES ET
LUGANO 133 (2d ed. 1996); Georges Droz, Delendum est Forum Contractus, 1997
REC. DALLOZ CHRONIQUE 351.
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has something to recommend itself.'
In the event that such negotiations with the Brus-
sels/Lugano nations were to succeed, could the United States
Supreme Court be expected to declare the resulting convention
to be unconstitutional if the jurisdictional bases agreed upon
do not, in all respects, conform to its case law? I do not believe
so. Statements by some of the Justices suggest their awareness
of the problematic nature of current American jurisdictional
law.' As Professor Goldstein observed, a jurisdictional "sys-
tem cannot be developed adequately by sporadic case law, but
rather requires a comprehensive legislative approach."6 It
would be truly astonishing if the Court were to hold unconsti-
tutional jurisdictional and recognition practices that have
worked well, for several decades, linking European civil law
and common law nations smoothly and effectively. 7 As far as
third countries are concerned, Europe and the United States
would render a major contribution to worldwide Full Faith and
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